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Abstract 
 
There is an apparent gap between public policy on embryo research in the United Kingdom 
and its ostensible justification. The rationale is respect for the “special status” of the embryo, 
but the policy actively promotes research in which embryos are destroyed. Richard Harries 
argues that this is consistent because, the “special status” of the human embryo is less than 
the absolute status of persons. However this intermediate moral status does no evident work 
in decisions relating to the human embryo. Rather, public policy seems to be based on a 
different account of “special status”: that developed by Mary Warnock. According to this, 
the embryo has no inherent status and the language of “special status” serves rather to 
accommodate the feelings of those who object to embryo research.  This “emotivist” account 
is highly problematic, not so much for its attitude to the embryo as for its subversion of 
public moral reasoning. 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to understand how the phrase “the special status of the human 
embryo” functions in law and public policy in the United Kingdom. It is not primarily 
concerned with the moral status of embryo in itself, that is, with the level of respect or 
protection that it merits. It therefore does not seek to express a view as to whether the 
embryo is shown too much respect, too little respect, or an appropriate degree of respect. 
The author naturally has a view on this, and in the interests of transparency, can let it be 
known that he would wish policy to show greater respect to the human embryo, and indeed 
this preference may well be apparent at some points in the article. Nevertheless, the 
primary focus of this argument is not the level of respect given but is rather the rationale 
that is typically given for public policy on human embryo research and how to understand 
the observed practice in relation to this rationale. 
 
I. The apparent gap between rationale and policy in the United Kingdom 
 
It should be noted that the status of the human embryo is not the only ethical issue at stake 
in the embryo research debate. Indeed, in the 1970s this was less prominent in the assisted 
reproduction debate than the issue of safety.i The issue of eugenics was also important, 
particularly in the German debate, but not only there.ii Tom Banchoff asserts that even the 
Vatican at first saw the issue of embryo research primarily in relation to the ethics of 
procreation and only later in the mid-1980s began to associate embryo experimentation 
more with abortion as a “pro-life” issue.iii In the cloning scandal in South Korea in 2005 
involving the disgraced scientist Hwang Woo-suk ethical concerns were first raised about 
how he obtained sufficient quantities of human oocytes. It was alleged that he had paid and 
even coerced women into “donating” their eggs.iv The issue of the embryo played little role 
in that controversy.v So also the impact of assisted reproduction and of human embryo 
research programmes on women has sometimes played an important role in framing 
2 
 
national legislation in this area, as for example in Canada.vi The status of the embryo is thus 
far from the only ethical issue relevant to the regulation of the use of human embryos in 
research.vii  
 
It is significant, therefore, that the embryo research debate in the United Kingdom, and the 
public policy that emerged from that debate, has been framed primarily in terms of the 
moral status of the human embryo. This has repeatedly been given as the rationale for the 
law in the United Kingdom. Thus the Warnock Reportviii of 1984 concluded that “the embryo 
of the human species ought to have a special status”.ix This status was declared to be “a 
matter of fundamental principle which should be enshrined in legislation”.x The Warnock 
Report provided the basis for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.  
 
Furthermore, in subsequent Reports by the House of Lords in 2002, the House of Commons 
in 2005, and by both Houses in 2007, the principles of the Warnock Report, and in particular 
the “special status” of the human embryo, have been asserted to provide the fundamental 
rationale for legislation in this area:  
 
 “The starting point for consideration of the ethics of research on human embryos is the 
status of the early embryo”xi  
 
“We have concluded that the embryo should be accorded special status in common with the 
Warnock Committee”xii  
 
“We acknowledge that the special status of the embryo means regulation of both research 
and treatment continues to be appropriate and desirable”xiii  
 
The “special status” of the human embryo has thus been reiterated many times as the very 
basis of legislation in the United Kingdom. This is the rationale given by Parliamentary 
Committees and by government ministers, by those involved in shaping the law.  
 
As policy on embryo research is ostensibly based on the moral status of the embryo, one 
might expect it to be relatively restrictive, if not absolutely so. However, in practice the 
United Kingdom is at the least restrictive end of the political spectrum. For example, it has 
not signed the 1997 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine in part because this 
convention prohibits the creation of embryos for research.xiv  
 
The same pattern can be seen in a non-binding vote of the United Nations in 2005: the 
Declaration on Human Cloning, which opposed all forms of human cloning, was passed by 
84 votes to 34 with 37 abstentions.xv The UK was in the pro-cloning minority, the smallest 
group.  
 
In 2006, Isasi and Knoppersxvi analysed the embryo research policies of 50 countries and 
categorised them as restrictive, intermediary, or liberal. The largest group, of 27 countries, 
adopted an intermediary approach not too strict, not too lax, the second largest group was 
restrictive in orientation, and included 16 countries. The smallest category with only 7 
countries was the liberal group, among which was the United Kingdom. It was among a 
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“negligible number of countries”xvii which specifically permitted cloning embryos for 
research.  
 
Two years later, in 2008 a new law was passed in the United Kingdom, the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. This act considered embryos that could be created 
by mixing human and non-human material, including genetic modification of human 
embryos and crossing human gametes with those of other animals. It specifically permitted 
every conceivable category of embryo to be created for research, subject to a licence, to the 
14 day limit, to not being transferred into a woman or animal.xviii Yet again this legislation 
put the United Kingdom at the furthest extent of what any country had explicitly permitted.  
 
When we move from legislation to regulation, to what is done in practice, we see the same 
unwillingness to restrict embryo research.  
 
The regulator, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) shows little 
evidence of willingness to restrict embryo research in practice. By 2008, 1.2 million embryos 
had been destroyed or discarded in clinical practice or research in the UK.xix In the same 
period the HFEA had only once refused a research license, and this was later granted on 
appeal.xx This apparent profligacy in the use of human embryos and the extraordinary 
record of never ultimately refusing a research license makes it difficult to substantiate the 
claim that research is “subject to stringent controls and monitoring”xxi. The Secretary of 
State explained the then 100% success of research licence applications on the basis that 
“the HFEA works closely with research teams on the development of the project”xxii. 
However, this very proximity raises the danger of a lack of independence from the interests 
the HFEA is supposed regulate.  
 
In 2005 the chair of the HFEA told parliament that she thought that “you must subscribe to 
the acceptability of embryo research”xxiii in order to be a member of the HFEA. This seems to 
exclude from membership those who would show too high a regard for the status of the 
embryo. However, there was no suggestion that having too little respect for the embryo was 
an obstacle to membership.xxiv Thus while the Warnock Report recommended that the HFEA 
should not be “unduly influenced by sectional interests” and that “its membership must be 
wide-ranging”,xxv it seems that in practice the membership represents the more pro-
research end of the spectrum.  
 
Furthermore, the same House of Commons also expressed concern that the HFEA, rather 
than act as a watchdog had acted as lobby organisation on behalf of the fertility industry. 
“We are concerned that the HFEA has crossed the boundary from regulation to advocacy… it 
has acted outside its statutory remit and crossed a boundary that risks compromising 
public trust”.xxvi This same attitude also seems to be exhibited in at least some of the public 
consultations of the HFEA. The feminist scholar Françoise Baylis, after a detailed analysis of 
one such consultation, concludes that the HFEA “had a clear policy preference in support of 
research… [and] it sought to communicate this preference to those who were consulted. 
Indeed, in many respects, the HFEA consultation process can be seen as an exercise in 
strategic public relations”.xxvii  
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In summary: There is an apparent gap between the ostensible rationale of law and policy in 
the United Kingdom (which is to respect the special status of the human embryo) and the 
content of that policy in practice (which serves to promote research using embryos). The 
aim here is not to argue which of these attitudes represents a more reasonable or ethical 
public policy for embryo research, only to exhibit the prima facie disjunction between 
ethically conservative language and ethically permissive practice. 
  
II. The conventional explanation: warranted but not absolute respect 
 
One way to explain this apparent paradox is by distinguishing different possible accounts of 
the moral status of the embryo. Within the context of the debate in the United Kingdom it 
has become conventional to distinguish three broad categories of approach. These could be 
summarised as follows: 
 
1. that the embryo is a human life and therefore is entitled to conferral of full 
human rights;  
2. that the development of personhood is a gradual process but that the 
embryo is entitled to some protection; and  
3. that the embryo is no more than a collection of cells, albeit with the potential 
to develop into a human being.xxviii  
 
The first approach would, of course, guarantee full human rights and protection, and it is 
this possibility that is most immediately suggested by words such as “respect”, as for 
example in the World Medical Association Declaration of Geneva of 1948, “I will maintain 
the utmost respect for human life, from the time of its conception, even under threat”.xxix 
This approach typically lays great stress of the humanity of the embryo: “a human embryo is 
a whole living member of the species Homo sapiens in the earliest stage of his or her natural 
development”.xxx Nevertheless, without prejudice to the arguments in favour or against this 
position, it is clear that this form of respect or moral status is not that which embodied by 
legislation in the United Kingdom. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
permits the destructive use of embryos in research, which it could not do if the embryo 
were treated as possessing full human rights. 
 
The third approach is less an account of moral status than the bald denial of moral status, as 
is asserted by Professor Julian Savulescu with admirable frankness, “The embryo does not 
have a moral status, above that which is derived from the interests of a couple or individual 
to have a child”.xxxi This instrumental approach would clearly allow use of human embryos 
for research but is not compatible with the repeated assertions of “special status” which 
characterise policy statements in the United Kingdom. No status is not a special status. 
 
According to the second approach, which one might term inherent but intermediate status, 
the human embryo possesses a “special” moral status that deserves respect but the respect 
due to the embryo is less than the “absolute respect” due to adult persons. This is the 
approach taken by Richard Harries,xxxii the Anglican bishop who both chaired the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Stem Cell Research (in 2001) and was a member of the HFEA 
(from 2003 to 2009) and for a brief period was its interim chair (in 2006). According to 
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Bishop Harries, the “special status” of the embryo is intermediate, a middle way between 
full status and no status. Full moral status would not permit the use of human embryos; no 
status would allow use but would contradict the stated rationale for the law. The “special 
status” of the embryo is purportedly an intermediate status that implies some respect and 
shows this respect through the stringent requirements of the law.  
 
“All this, it seems to me, gives substance to the claim that the early embryo does indeed 
have ‘a special status’ in law and that behind this special status is the idea that although it 
does not have the absolute respect due to persons it does have the moral respect which it 
warrants.”xxxiii  
 
However, if respect for the embryo is supposed to be more than that due to a clump of cells 
but less than that due to a person, with an intermediate status that increases gradually 
through development, this immediately raises a number of puzzling questions: 
 
• Does the idea of gradation contradict the idea of respect?xxxiv 
• If respect can reasonably be graduated, how much respect should be shown to the 
embryo at the various stages of its development?  
• Why, for example, allow research only up to 14 days if abortion is legal in the United 
Kingdom up to 24 weeks and up to birth for reason of disability?  
• Why is there no gradation of penalties for transgression of the law in accordance 
with the age of an embryo used in research? 
• How is one to establish moral criteria for these decisions?  
• Does this intermediate status require a specific philosophy of the person to give it 
content? 
• Or is there more than one philosophical approach that could justify “special status”, 
in which case, is there more than one set of criteria?  
• How can “special status” do the real work needed to make concrete decisions? 
 
The idea of a “special status” which is more than nothing and less than everything is in fact 
radically ambiguous, as philosophically and theologically there are innumerable more or less 
restrictive forms of intermediate status. A modern theory of personhood as defended by 
philosophers such as John Harris or Peter Singer represents one form of intermediate status, 
a gradual increase in status from fertilisation to self-awareness, but it would not give any 
significant status to the embryo or foetus until it was sentient. It would be almost nothing. 
On the other hand the Christian tradition, while it has sometimes included a kind of 
intermediate status (for example, graded penalties for abortion) has never sanctioned the 
deliberate destruction of human life at any stage of development.xxxv It is almost everything.  
 
To establish criteria as to where to place the middle way, how to treat the embryo at what 
stage of development, it is therefore necessary to construct a philosophical account of the 
embryo that neither collapses into the personhood view preferred by many modern 
bioethicists nor tends to the full moral status view supported by the Geneva Declaration 
(and, arguably, by the mainstream of the Christian tradition until the twentieth century). 
Furthermore this middle position would have to be specified with the level of detail and 
rigour that could act as a guide to action in relation to how much protection at what stage. 
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However, there is no widely accepted account of “special status” that provides such detail. 
It remains forever hazy, set out only in general terms. 
 
Furthermore, as has been pointed out, neither in law nor in public policy does the United 
Kingdom represent an intermediate position. On any international comparison, United 
Kingdom policy is consistently at one end of the spectrum, among the most pragmatic or 
instrumental in its attitude to the human embryo. While the HFEA pays lip service to the 
“special status” of the human embryo, it shows great reluctance ever to restrict research for 
the sake of respecting the embryo. “HFEA has long supported a permissive legislative 
framework for human embryo research—all such research should proceed on condition that 
the purpose of the research is legally permitted and the research is limited to 14 days.”xxxvi  
 
III. An alternative explanation: Warnock’s emotivist account of “special status” 
 
There is, however, an alternative explanation for this apparent gap between rationale and 
policy on embryo research. While the Warnock Report coined the term “special status”, 
Warnock’s own account of respect for the “special status” of the embryo is subtly different 
from the conventional account of inherent intermediate status defended by Harries and 
others. This alternative approach can be seen at work even in the Warnock Report itself. 
Rather than engage with “questions of when life or personhood begin” Warnock sought 
instead go “straight to the question of how it is right to treat the human embryo”.xxxvii She 
thus sought to “bypass the concept of the person altogether”.xxxviii What then was the basis 
for attributing moral status to the embryo? Consider the following passage from the 
Warnock Report: 
 
“Nevertheless, because of the special status that we accord to the human embryo, such 
research must be subject to stringent controls and monitoring… We see these controls as 
essential to safeguard the public interest and to allay widespread anxiety.”xxxix  
 
It begins with reference to the status of the embryo, but at the end of the paragraph an 
alternative reason is given for these restrictions: to allay public anxiety. The legal scholar 
Professor Emily Jackson, herself now deputy chair of the HFEA, gives an illuminating 
interpretation of this: 
 
“A majority of the Warnock Committee admitted that the instrumental use of the early 
human embryo will profoundly offend those who believe that a person comes into being 
immediately after fertilization, but decided that that offence has to be put into the balance 
with the benefits which may flow from embryo research.”xl  
 
Note that what is being compared with possible benefits from research is not harm to the 
embryo but moral offence to the public. The embryo itself has dropped out of consideration. 
Lest anyone question whether Jackson, writing much later, is reading this view back into the 
report we have the words of Warnock herself, writing in 1987 only three years after the 
publication of the Report. 
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“So no harm could come to it by its being destroyed, only to someone else. But the harm to 
someone else could take no other form than an offence to moral feelings.”xli  
 
“And so we come to the compromise . . . the attempt to balance utilitarian consideration of 
beneficial outcome against moral feelings that human cells, though not identical with 
human beings, yet need to be treated differently.”xlii  
 
Note that Warnock is adamant that the destruction of a human embryo does it no harm: so 
all that is left to compare is the more or less realistic prospect of beneficial outcomes over 
and against the more or less strong feelings of offence. The embryo itself does not figure, it 
cannot be harmed; Warnock thus explicitly denies the embryo any inherent moral status.  
 
It should be clear that this is not an account of the moral status of the embryo, which is 
treated only as the object of moral feelings. It is, rather, an emotivist account of moral 
discourse about the embryo. By emotivism, I mean the view that moral statements should 
be understood as no more or less than expressions of feeling, in this case, the feelings of 
those who object to destroying human embryos. In describing her philosophical account she 
states that she has moved beyond pure utilitarianism and is seeking to mix this with some 
accommodation of moral feelings.  
 
“And, at this point, I am inclined to think that utilitarianism breaks down. For as soon as the 
criterion of right and wrong moves from a plain calculation of benefits and harms, and 
begins to take into account people’s moral sentiments, then I believe it becomes a different 
theory.”xliii  
 
Warnock’s approach is highly problematic. It is disingenuous to call this an account of “the 
status of the embryo” when the embryo has dropped out of consideration and it is only the 
moral feelings of objectors that are considered. Furthermore, it is an arbitrary admixture of 
theories, for the case in favour of using embryos is described in utilitarian terms as though it 
had no subjective element, while the case against is described only in relation to the feelings 
of the proponents, as though the embryo has no objective moral status. However, if it could 
be demonstrated that the embryo had no inherent or objective moral status then it is not 
clear why the offense taken by its defenders would be worthy of such respect. This point is 
well made by Professor John Harris. 
 
“[T]he crucial problem entirely ignored by Warnock is that not all feelings are moral feelings 
and not all outrage is moral outrage. So that while we ought to respect the moral beliefs and 
feelings of others even when we don’t share them, we have no reason to respect their 
prejudices.”xliv 
 
Ironically, while Warnock is seeking to show respect to those who object to embryo 
research, it is Harris who shows greater respect. For, in distinguishing moral outrage from 
prejudice, Harris redirects us to the content and rationale of those feelings. Those who 
object to the destruction of human embryos are not primarily objecting that people do not 
respect their feelings. They are objecting because they regard the embryo as having some 
inherent moral worth or status (even if it only an intermediate moral status). Harris denies 
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that embryos possess any such inherent worth, but at least he is addressing the question of 
the status of the embryo itself. He is not seeking to by-pass this question or to re-describe 
moral status in terms of the expression of emotion. 
 
IV. Warnock’s account as a description of the use of “special status” language 
 
Warnock’s approach thus utterly fails as a convincing account of what it is to respect the 
moral status of the embryo. Indeed such an account fails not only to respect the embryo but 
even to respect the moral feelings of those who respect the embryo. However, while 
Warnock’s approach is deeply flawed as an account of the meaning of moral status of the 
embryo, it may be helpful as an account of the use of this language in the British political 
context.  
 
Here some illumination may be provided by Alasdair MacIntyre who has argued that, 
understood historically, emotivism is better regarded not as a general analytic account of 
the meaning of moral terms, but as an empirical account of how moral terms are used in a 
specific context. The theory of emotivism was first propounded in Cambridge in the early 
twentieth century. The immediate context of this theory was the influence of GE Moore for 
whom moral judgement was supposed to be a matter of intuiting “the presence or absence 
of the non-natural property of good”.xlv However, as such a non-natural property does not 
exist, except as a philosopher’s fancy, this was a hopeless task. There was therefore a “gap 
between the meaning and purport of what was being said and the use to which the 
utterance was being put”.xlvi 
 
In analogous way, it seems that there is a gap between meaning and use in relation to the 
“special status” of the human embryo. The actual use of this term is accurately discerned by 
Warnock not to reflect an inherent but intermediate respect for the embryo, rather it 
reflects a purely instrumental status, subject only to the need to maintain public confidence. 
“Special status” thus stands as a cipher for public feelings. This explains why consultations of 
the HFEA have the strategic function of managing public reactions, for on this account the 
function of the whole regulatory structure is not to grant actual protection to the embryo, 
but rather to maintain public support for policies decided primarily on utilitarian grounds.   
 
Warnock’s account of the moral status of the embryo also explains why the HFEA have been 
so concerned with public opinion. According to Harries “The work of the HFEA is affected by 
a number of factors. The first is public opinion.”xlvii If the ethical foundation of regulation is 
the moral status of the embryo, why is it so important to continue to assess public 
attitudes? Neither ethics committees that concern research on human subjects nor those 
concerned with animal welfare take such a keen interest in public opinion. Their primary 
focus is on the welfare of the human or nonhuman subjects of the research.  This is surely 
because, in these cases it is the research subject itself that is the focus of ethical concern, 
whereas the interests of the embryo do not seem to figure prominently in the deliberations 
of the HFEA. The embryo itself has no status. 
 
The Warnock account of “special status” also shows why this term is so frequently defended 
by those who wish to deregulate embryo research. A good example is the Science and 
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Technology Committee Report of 2005. This committee was deeply divided with five of the 
ten members dissenting and issuing a statement that the report adopted “an extreme 
libertarian approach from the start”, and was “unbalanced, light on ethics, goes too far in 
the direction of deregulation and is too dismissive of public opinion and much of the 
evidence”.xlviii It is striking that this highly permissive committee, writing in a context which 
is already highly permissive by international standards, nevertheless appealed to “the 
Warnock Committee’s approach to the status of the embryo.”xlix Indeed so entrenched was 
this approach that the committee found that “the third view, that the embryo is no more 
than a ball of cells, has not been expressed to us in this inquiry”l. This is readily explicable if 
the third view, the explicitly instrumentalist approach, had become redundant. “Special 
status” is invoked by those promoting deregulation because, as the term is used in the UK 
debate, special status simply is a disguised form of instrumental status.  
 
The situation in the United Kingdom thus embodies the irony of using the language of status 
as a means to strip the embryo of status.li This has been described as “deregulation by 
regulation”lii. Far from being a compromise position establishing a real but intermediate 
status it represents an instrumental use not only of the embryo itself but of the public 
language of moral status. 
 
Warnock’s account of the actual use of the term “special status” also shows why policy 
makers can appeal to the concept despite there being no philosophical consensus around an 
intermediate status that could support decision-making criteria; these criteria are not in fact 
needed, for the content of “special status” does no work, its function is not to guide policy 
but to act as a façade to shield policy constructed on a different basis: by assessing how far 
it is possible to promote embryo research while maintaining public confidence. The aim of 
the legislation, as Jackson has astutely observed, is not actually to protect the embryo but is 
to minimise offence. 
 
“the restrictions placed upon embryo research are not principally concerned to protect the 
individual embryo… and instead [are] concerned principally with ensuring that scientists’ 
behaviour minimises, as far as possible, moral offence”.liii 
 
With passage of time Warnock’s approach has become entrenched in the United Kingdom 
with the result that the question of the status of the embryo has been assumed to be 
settled. Yet “special status” as this phrase is used in the UK debate has no inherent content 
but functions as a mechanism to manage public concerns, so that the issue of the inherent 
status of the embryo has not been resolved so much as “by-passed”.  
 
That the rationale for public policy relies on a deception, a denial of status disguised as the 
attribution of status, is something Warnock herself now seems to admit. 
 
“I regret that in the original report that led up to the 1990 legislation we used words such as 
‘respect for the embryo’ … you cannot respectfully pour something down the sink – which is 
the fate of the embryo after it has been used for research, or if is not going to be used for 
research or for anything else”.liv 
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Inasmuch as Warnock’s original account of “special status” accurately reflects its use in 
public policy discussions in the United Kingdom, this is deeply problematic, even from a 
utilitarian perspective. For even if this usage is regarded as a political device that has utility 
in defusing public anxiety while allowing human embryos to be used, it is a deceptive device 
that relies on disguising its true rationale. Such a strategy, even if defensible in utilitarian 
terms, relies on Sidgwick’s principle that “a Utilitarian may reasonably desire, on Utilitarian 
principles, that some of his conclusions should be rejected by mankind generally”lv. 
However, this is to abandon the transparency of public moral reasoning, a move that is 
controversial even among utilitarians. It represents an elitist, anti-democratic and even a 
colonial attitude, what Bernard Williams has termed “government house utilitarianism”lvi.  
 
V. The review of the HFEA and the implications of this analysis 
 
The present political context for this discussion in the United Kingdom is the question of 
whether the responsibilities of the HFEA might be re-assigned as part of a larger review of 
arms-length bodies. In this context, the chair of the HFEA, Professor Lisa Jardine, has warned 
that this would threaten the status of the embryo. 
 
“My worry is that… the safeguarding of the 'special status of the embryo' will be lost – that 
fundamental principle laid down in the Warnock report, which provides special protection in 
law for the human embryo and embryonic material outside the body.”lvii 
 
A similar point was made by Professor Jackson, 
 
“On the other hand, if the HFEA disappears and embryo research becomes just one part of a 
much larger body’s remit, the original justification for setting up the HFEA in the first place – 
the special status of the human embryo – may become lost. Public support for embryo 
research in the UK is high, but surveys consistently show that it is contingent on the 
existence of strict regulation.”lviii  
 
This appeal has drawn calls of support, with more or less reluctance, from those who regard 
the human embryo as possessing some real inherent moral status. Hence, for example Ian 
Galloway, Convener of the Church and Society Council of the Church of Scotland stated that,  
 
“We are concerned that if the regulation of research on human embryos is handed to a 
more general body, the special status of the embryo recognised in law will be further 
eroded. This special status is a fundamental principle laid down the Warnock report, and 
prevents human embryos from being used in routine research.”lix 
 
So also Lord Alton of Liverpool, an indefatigable defender of the full moral status of the 
human embryo, has expressed his caution by quoting a verse of Hilaire Belloc, “always keep 
a-hold of Nurse, For fear of finding something worse”.lx  
 
The analysis presented here suggests that Galloway and Alton had been mistaken in thinking 
that if the HFEA is abolished “the special status of the embryo recognised in law will be 
further eroded”. For, the concept of “special status” in the context of public policy is not an 
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inherent but intermediate status recognised by law but is a cipher that acts to strip the 
embryo of status. This may be discerned even in the way that Jackson juxtaposes “special 
status” with the need for “public support”. This juxtaposition coheres perfectly with the key 
claim of this paper, that the concept of “special status” has no inherent content but 
functions as a mechanism to maintain public support. Later in the same article Jackson 
quotes Hon Andrew Lansley MP as saying, “It was always clear that the legislation is not 
intended simply to facilitate research”lxi. However, an alternative explanation is that the law 
and system of regulation were indeed established “simply to facilitate research” and this 
facilitation was to be achieved through the managing of public sentiment. Such 
management is instrumental or in Francois Baylis’s terms “strategic” and it is for this reason 
that the HFEA in its consultations aims “to change the ideas, attitudes and behaviors of 
publics but not those of the organization”.lxii  
 
The HFEA was established on the basis of the Warnock Committee approach and such an 
approach is not based on an attribution of inherent but intermediate moral status to the 
human embryo. The special status of the embryo has always been a cipher for other 
concerns, principally the maintenance of public confidence. Nor is there a danger that 
matters would become “worse”, for those for whom “worse” means more use of human 
embryos in research. Both the philosophical analysis of “special status” provided here (that 
such “status” is understood in emotivist terms), and the actual behaviour the HFEA, as 
evident in the conduct of its consultations and the character of its subsequent decisions, 
demonstrates that it always acts so as to promote the use of human embryos as far as it can 
within the limits of its powers and the limits of public opinion.  
 
This paper has identified a problem with UK public policy on embryo research, not in 
relation to how much or little respect is shown to the embryo, for this substantive question 
is outside the scope of the present discussion. The key problem here identified is that UK 
public policy embodies an emotivist approach to discussion of the moral status of the 
human embryo. Ruth Deech, a former chair of the HFEA has warned against any radical 
change arguing that “in all such amalgamations history tells us that very often you go back 
to ground zero”lxiii. In practice this seems unlikely, as it underestimates the extent to which 
the Warnock Report and its principles are almost certain to remain the point of reference 
for public policy discussion in the United Kingdom.lxiv However, were it achievable, ground 
zero is precisely where we should wish to get back to in relation to the status of the human 
embryo. For, moral theories are perpetuated by the institutions in which they are 
embedded and the HFEA embodies an approach to the “special status” of the human 
embryo that is deceptive, corrupting to public moral discourse, and that effectively 
suppresses honest debate and reflection on a fundamental moral question.  
 
In summary, a public policy has been established in the United Kingdom that is not only 
instrumentalist about the embryo but is instrumentalist in its use of moral language and 
instrumentalist in its attitude to the public. The exposing of this conceit is a prerequisite for 
an open debate about the degree of respect that is actually due to the human embryo itself 
whether this be the utmost respect, or an intermediate degree of respect, or, in all honesty, 
no respect at all.  
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